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Abstract
This article enquires into the causes of union growth and decline by analysing
flows in and out of membership at the level of 70 Swiss union locals over
2006–2008. Gross flows in union membership are much larger than the resulting
net changes: annual membership turnover of 10 per cent is a surprisingly
constant feature across unions. Net changes in membership are primarily deter-
mined by inflows: successful and languishing union locals differ in their entry
rates, whereas exit rates are similar. Variance in union locals’ entry rates is not
usefully explained by the labour market context, but by differences in union
strategy.
1. Introduction
Trade unions play an essential role in determining the level of wage inequality
or welfare state spending in Western European economies. In doing so,
unions draw their influence and legitimacy, to a large extent, from their
membership base. Growth and decline in union membership is thus not only
consequential for unions themselves, but also affects countries’ pattern of
economic development and social cohesion. Accordingly, this article enquires
into determinants of unions’ success and failure in increasing their member-
ship. In this undertaking, we diverge in two aspects from the bulk of earlier
research on union growth and decline.
First, we select a different unit of analysis: there is an abundance of empiri-
cal enquiries into both micro- and macro-determinants of union growth in
Western Europe. While micro-level research typically uses individual-level
surveys and enquires into members’ characteristics and motivations to join
a union (e.g. Visser 2002; Waddington and Whitston 1997), macro-level
research analyses union density on a country level and tries to explain
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variation with institutions, employment composition across sectors or the
business cycle (e.g. Checchi and Visser 2005; Western 1995). With a few
notable exceptions (Hancké 1993; Undy et al. 1981), a third level of analysis
has received surprisingly little attention: the meso-level of the union local —
the place where recruitment and retention activities take place and where
members are actually organized.
From a methodological point of view, the local union may well offer a
more useful perspective to explain variation in union membership. The idea
is that workers make their decision to join a union on the basis of their
experience at the workplace — depending on how easy the access is to a local
union and how well the local union deals with their grievances and provides
them with services. Union locals are thus the primary recruitment centres
(Hancké 1993: 596). At the same time, union locals differ significantly in their
ability to recruit and retain members — depending on their strategic choices
and organizational priorities. An illustration is provided by Undy et al.’s
(1981) large British study, which shows strong variation in membership
evolution between unions of the same sector as well as between union locals
pertaining to the same union. These findings point to the crucial importance
of local union leaderships. By focusing on the union local, this article thus
adopts a perspective of union density where actors’ choices matter (Baccaro
et al. 2003). The relevance of strategic choice is widely acknowledged in
research into political parties’ fortune (e.g. Kitschelt 1994; Scharpf 1991). In
contrast, union growth and decline is still commonly explained with the sole
reference to institutions and economic conditions, whereas the actors them-
selves — unions — are often treated as secondary and their strategic choices
largely deemed irrelevant (yet for exceptions see Frege and Kelly 2004;
Milkman and Voss 2004).
Second, we partially diverge from earlier research with respect to the
dependent variable. The literature on union membership typically focuses on
annual net growth or decline in membership figures. However, annual net
flows hide interesting dynamics of gross flows, that is entries into and exits
out of union membership. Since duration of union membership is on average
only a few years (Vaona 2008; Visser 2002), there is constant turnover of
union members. Hence, even for stagnating membership figures, unions need
to renew every year a substantial share of their membership in order to
compensate for outflows. In other words, for unions ‘it takes all the running
you can do to keep in the same place’ (Freeman 1988: 73). Accordingly, we
focus on gross flows in and out of union locals to get a better understanding
of net change in union membership.
We do so for Switzerland, a country where the union movement has
adopted a type of industrial unionism and sectoral bargaining similar to that
of Germany and the Netherlands, but where the decentralized political
system affords local unions with greater autonomy. Yet as we will show
below, the size of union entry and exit rates are surprisingly similar across
West European countries. We thus probably deal here with mechanisms that
are not specific to Switzerland. Our analysis is based on tailor-made register
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data stemming from 70 Swiss union locals, for which membership move-
ments are observed over the three-year period 2006–2008. Union locals are
either part ofUnia, Switzerland’s by far largest private sector union (56 union
locals) or vpod, one of Switzerland’s largest public sector unions (14 union
locals).
Our findings suggest that changes in union membership are primarily
determined by inflows. Successful union locals differ from languishing ones
with respect to their entry rates, whereas exit rates show less variance. They
are largely given by the labour market context and follow, to some extent,
entry rates: a period of successful recruitment and large inflows goes along
with higher outflows. Moreover, we observe large variance in union locals’
in- and outflows that is neither accounted for by employment evolution nor
by the demographic composition of the recruitment area. In contrast, inflows
and outflows are strongly affected by differences of sector and region —
differences that appear largely attributable to union organization and
strategy.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 takes up a series of conceptual
issues linked to flows in and out of union membership and compares
two different strategies of union organization: a retention-centred and a
recruitment-centred strategy. Section 3 discusses the institutional specificities
of Swiss industrial relations, presents the data on union locals and shows how
labour market controls are measured. Section 4 provides empirical evidence
for the extent of flows in and out of union membership and analyzes their
determinants. Section 5 examines the robustness of our results by doing a
series of plausibility checks, before Section 6 concludes with the policy impli-
cations of our findings.
2. Linking gross flows to net change in union membership
In theory, growth in union membership can be obtained through two chan-
nels: through an increase in the entry ratewhile keeping the exit rate constant,
or through a decrease in the exit rate for an unchanged entry rate. Trade
unions are, like any other economic agent, confronted with opportunity
costs, which constrain them to focus resources on some activities at the
expense of others. Union resources primarily consist of the working time
officials are able to allocate to different activities. In the presence of oppor-
tunity costs, two organizational strategies to increase membership can sche-
matically be distinguished.
A first strategy consists in minimizing outflows, where unions try to reduce
turnover by focusing their resources on the strengthening of member loyalty.
This goal may be achieved through either an organizing or a servicing model.
The organizing model implies the set-up of participatory opportunities and
the organization of collective member activities in order to involve members
into union affairs and thus foster union commitment. In contrast, the servic-
ing model implies a stronger focus on the professional handling of members’
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individual queries and the continuous investment in selective rewards such as
financial packages and further education offers, closely targeting members’
needs. Particularly in servicing, great emphasis is put on ‘customer-care’ and
hence the retention of already affiliated members.
A second strategy is less concerned about avoiding outflows, but more
about maximizing inflows of new members. This is done by channelling
resources into recruitment activities. Such a strategy implies that union rep-
resentatives spend most of their time preparing recruitment campaigns and
organizing new members at workplaces, at the expense of spending long
hours in the office handling individual queries or organizing assemblies —
two activities that primarily cater to already affiliated members. Thus, the
decision to spend time and resources on the recruitment of new members is
likely to conflict with unions’ responsibility to service existing members
(Towers 1997: 96).
Already in the 1950, it was argued that a high degree of member turnover
creates apathy and that, as a consequence, unions should redirect their ener-
gies from the task of getting new members to that of more effectively retain-
ing those already affiliated (Goldstein 1952). Likewise, in recent years, studies
on union organization have emphasized the importance of reducing mem-
bership turnover (Waddington 2006; Waddington and Kerr 1999). While a
coherent retention strategy is clearly integral to union growth, our hypothesis
is that trade unions have much greater influence on inflows than on outflows.
In other terms, we expect differences in unions’ membership evolution to be
affected more strongly by the entry than the exit rate. The reason has to do
with the determinants of inflows and outflows.
We expect inflows of new members into unions to be largely determined by
parameters on which unions have a direct influence, most importantly a
successful recruitment strategy: what sectors, firms and wage earner groups
are targeted with what language and product? Where union locals are
dynamic and invest most of their resources into the recruitment and defence
of adequately targeted employee groups, we expect much higher inflows than
where union locals mostly administer the status quo and invest very little
effort into the recruitment of new members. In other words, where unions
embark on a strategy of sustained recruitment and shift resources towards
recruitment officers and organizing, they are more likely to achieve member-
ship growth than where unions rely on passive recruitment and leave the
affiliation of new members, by and large, to shop stewards or work councils
(Kelly and Heery 1989: 197).
Unions’ influence on outflows seems, in comparison, much smaller. Survey-
based research from different countries suggests that the reasons why
members leave a union are predominantly linked to changes in their job
circumstances. Hence, three studies for Britain observe a surprisingly similar
share of between 60 and 70 per cent of former union members who motivate
their union exit with changes in their job situation: retirement, unemploy-
ment or moving to a job without a union (Gallie 1996: 170; Waddington
2006: 22; Waddington and Kerr 1999: 188). Likewise, a Dutch study finds the
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most important reason for leaving to be ‘external events in the working career
such as unemployment, childbirth and change of job or status (retirement)’
(Visser 2002: 418). In the same vein, a survey in the Spanish region Catalonia
reports that 60 per cent of union exits from Comisiones Obreras were moti-
vated by reasons related to the job, and not the union (Jódar et al. 2009: 15).
Finally, without giving a precise share, an Australian survey also finds the
most common cause for exiting a union to be the movement from a ‘union
job’ to a non-union workplace (Peetz 1998). These studies strongly suggest
that job-related factors are paramount for member outflows, with only about
25–35 per cent of union members in Britain, 35 in Catalonia and 40 in the
Netherlands having left because of dissatisfaction with union structure,
organization or policy.1
More than half of total turnover thus seems due to changes in members’
job environment, and hence to factors on which unions have little influence.
There is not much unions can offer to workers moving to jobs in sectors
outside their organizational area, to migrants returning to their home
country or to women leaving the labour market after child-birth. The exit
rate may thus vary less between dynamic and sluggish union locals than the
entry rate, and hence to be less consequential for union growth and decline.
This would imply that efforts concerning recruitment and inflows — and
not activities targeting retention and outflows — distinguish growing from
declining union locals. This argument is based on the expectation that inflows
are largely a consequence of union strategy, whereas outflows are determined
to a greater extent by structural factors. Four implications of this expectation
can be tested empirically:
• We should observe greater variance in member inflows than outflows
across union locals.
• Compared with outflows, inflows should account for more variance in net
change of union membership.
• Factors linked to union organization and strategy should explain more
variance in inflows than outflows.
• Factors linked to labour market evolution and employment structure
should explain more variance in outflows than inflows.
3. Study design: union structure, data and measures
We analyse flows into and out of union locals for Switzerland. The Swiss
union movement developed, comparable to German or Dutch unions,
according to the principle of industrial unionism where both union organi-
zation and collective bargaining articulate around the economic sector. Yet
unlike in Germany, but as in the Netherlands, organized labour in Switzer-
land remains divided into a secular and a religious union branch. Moreover,
union density at 19 per cent and bargaining coverage at 50 per cent are low
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in international comparison (Oesch 2011: 87). As in Germany, Swiss unions
continue to be dominated by semi-skilled male workers employed in manu-
facturing and construction, whereas service employees remain weakly orga-
nized. After decades of stability, Swiss unions have struggled with ongoing
membership erosion since the early 1990s. A first reaction has involved the
re-organization of the union structure through mergers. A second reaction
has been a stronger emphasis on recruitment, coupled with an increased use
of industrial disputes — a major change in Switzerland’s traditionally highly
cooperative system of industrial relations (Oesch 2011: 95). However, this
study is not primarily about Swiss unionism, but about the mechanisms
governing flows in and out of union membership —mechanisms that obey to
a similar logic across West European countries, as will be shown below.
Our analysis focuses on two unions: the public-sector union vpod and the
conglomerate private-sector union Unia. The result of a merger between four
unions in 2002, Unia has 200,000 members and is by far Switzerland’s largest
union, accounting for about 30 per cent of total Swiss union membership and
50 per cent of membership within the main union confederation SGB (Oesch
2011: 96). Unia is Switzerland’s principal union in construction, manufactur-
ing and private consumer services such as retail trade, hotels and restaurants.
In comparison, the public-sector union vpod2 is much smaller with 35,000
members. Still, in Switzerland’s organizationally fragmented public sector, it
is one of the major unions, recruiting workers in health care, education,
public administration and public transports.
Given Switzerland’s cultural diversity, its political system is highly decen-
tralized. Decentralization has also left its imprint on the union movement,
where not only unions’ sector organizations, but also their regional entities
within a sector enjoy considerable autonomy. This leads us to our definition
of the union local, a concept that can cover a variety of sometimes very
different organizations across countries (Hancké 1993: 596). Here, a union
local is defined as the functional unit that organizes workers of a given sector
in a given region. In the case of Unia, a matrix organization gives large
autonomy to 14 regions and the following four sectors: (i) the principal parts
of the building trade, (ii) the secondary parts of the building trade (called
artisanat thereafter), (iii) manufacturing and (iv) private services. By com-
bining Unia’s territorial and sectoral levels, we obtain the 56 organizational
units corresponding to the concept of a union local. Examples of such union
locals are ‘principal parts of the building trade in Zurich’, ‘manufacturing in
Geneva’ or ‘private services in Ticino’. This is the place where day-to-day
activities of recruitment and retention are planned and executed under the
direction of regional sector-leaders. For the smaller public-sector union vpod,
union locals need only be differentiated according to the same 14 regions.
Our database thus consists of 56 union locals pertaining toUnia and 14 union
locals pertaining to vpod.3 Variation in union locals’ gross membership are
recorded annually over the three-year period 2006–2008, which provides us
with 210 observations for member inflows and outflows (70 union locals
observed for three consecutive years). These data on aggregate changes in
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union locals’ membership have been tailor-made on the basis of raw data
provided to us by Unia and vpod.
Alongside our key variable, gross flows based on unions’ register data, we
need to account for differences in union locals’ labour market context. For
this reason, we compute measures based on the individual-level data con-
tained in the Swiss Labour Force Surveys (SAKE) 2005–2008. Providing
large samples of between 51,835 (2005) and 47,930 (2008) individuals, SAKE
is the standard data source to investigate employment change in Switzerland.
We create measures for three different indicators of the labour market cycle:
(i) the unemployment rate, (ii) change in the unemployment rate and (iii)
employment growth/decline. The literature leads us to expect lower entry and
higher exit rates in union locals where employment decreases and unemploy-
ment increases (Schnabel 2003: 22). In addition, we calculate workers’
average job tenure in years. The idea is that member outflows (and possibly
inflows) are higher in labour markets where, on average, employees’ job
tenure is low and turnover high. We further control for the share in the
workforce of two groups with lower attachment to the job, and hence pos-
sibly to union membership: women and foreigners (Vaona 2008: 264). This is
done by calculating women’s and foreign workers’ employment share in a
given union local’s recruitment area. Finally, we compute a measure for
union density in order to control for a union local’s market share — the
proportion of the workforce in a given region’s sector that is already orga-
nized. In- and outflows are likely to be lower in union locals where a large
share of workers are already unionized (as, for instance, in the principal
building trade of Jura or Ticino).
All these measures are computed for a target population that matches the
organizational areas of Unia’s and vpod’s union locals as closely as possible.
To give an example, we measure the unemployment rate (or average job
tenure or union market share, etc.) for private consumer services in Geneva,
for public services in Ticino or for manufacturing in Zurich. Although the
principal (builders, masons, etc.) and secondary trades of building (plumbers,
painters, electricians, etc.) are organized in different union locals inUnia, our
SAKE surveys do not keep these subsectors of construction apart. Hence, the
same labour market measures are used for union locals in these two sectors—
which does not seem problematic insofar as these two subsectors closely
resemble each other with respect to the business cycle and employment
composition. Table A1 in the Appendix section presents the descriptive sta-
tistics for these variables.
Alongside these labour market measures, we use qualitative knowledge to
compute several dummy variables. A first dummy is created for large cities —
Basel, Geneva and Zurich — where unions may have lower organizational
costs (Schnabel and Wagner 2005), but also more discontinuous member-
ship. A second dummy variable distinguishes union locals in Latin cantons
from union locals in German-speaking cantons: while the former may be
more influenced by French and Italian social movement unionism, the latter
are likely to be closer to Germany’s social partnership model. A third and last
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dummy variable differentiates union locals facing competition from other
labour organizations and union locals enjoying a quasi-monopoly in worker
representation. Basically, Unia’s union locals only face competition from
other unions in the few predominantly catholic regions such as Central
Switzerland, Fribourg, Ticino and Valais (from the social-christian union
Syna), in Geneva (from the regional union Sit) and in the manufacturing
sector in the German-speaking regions (from the white-collar union Anges-
tellte Schweiz). As to vpod, all its 14 union locals are confronted with com-
peting public-sector unions.
4. Empirical evidence for flows in and out of union membership
We begin our empirical analyses with a look at entry and exit rates of the two
trade unions under study. Table 1 thus shows that gross flows in and out of
union membership are much larger than the resulting net changes. vpod
registers an annual outflow from their membership of 9–10 per cent andUnia
of 12–13 per cent. These outflows imply that trade unions need to organize
large numbers of new workers each year to keep membership figures even. In
effect, newly recruitedmembers amount each year to around 9 (vpod) to 11 per
cent (Unia) of existing membership.While these inflow rates convey a sense of
dynamism, they were not high enough to compensate for member outflows
from Unia and vpod between 2006 and 2008, resulting in annual gaps of
between -0.2 (vpod in 2008) and -2.0 percentage points (Unia in 2007).
To what extent are these flows, observed for two Swiss unions, represen-
tative for other trade unions in Western Europe? Several studies suggest that
we deal here with a phenomenon that is very similar across countries. A
Spanish study reports an entry rate of 14.5 per cent and an exit rate of 11.3
per cent for Comisiones Obreras in Catalonia in 2004 (Jódar et al. 2009: 1). In
Britain’s large public-sector union Unison, both the entry and exit rate over
the 1990s stood at 12.5 per cent (Waddington and Kerr 1999: 185). Evidence
from the Dutch CBS union survey over the 1970s and 1980s shows member
movements to fluctuate between 6.1 and 12.4 per cent for annual entry rates
and between 7.2 and 11.1 per cent for annual exit rates (Van Ours 1991: 11).
Membership turnover of annually around 10 per cent thus seems a surpris-
ingly constant feature of West European unions.
TABLE 1
Annual Entry and Exit Rates of Members In and Out of the
Union (in %)
Entry rate Exit rate Net change
Unia vpod Unia vpod Unia vpod
2006 11.0 8.7 12.5 10.3 –1.5 –1.6
2007 11.0 9.0 13.0 9.3 –2.0 –0.3
2008 11.2 9.0 12.6 9.1 –1.3 –0.2
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We examine flows in greater detail by computing median and average entry
and exit rates into and out of the 210 union locals in our sample, differenti-
ated by sector (see Table 2). While the five sectors are very similar in terms of
size — each counting between 35,000 and 50,000 members4 — they strongly
differ with respect to turnover. By far the highest entry and exit rates can be
observed for union locals of Unia’s private service sector, mainly encompass-
ing low-skilled workers in retail trade, hotels and restaurants. Half of the
union locals organizing this sector achieved an annual entry rate of 17.4 per
cent or more, while the median exit rate was 16.8 per cent. In contrast, the
lowest gross flows apply to vpod’s public services, which mainly comprise
medium-skilled workers in health care, education, public administration and
transports. In this sector, half of all union locals limited the annual exit rate
to 8.9 per cent or less. At the same time, the median entry rate was much
lower with 7.6 per cent.
How much do in- and outflows vary across unions locals? The standard
deviations computed in Table 2 point towards two interesting results. First
with respect to the sector, we find union locals to vary much less in terms of
entry and exit rates within the principal trade of building and manufacturing
than within private and public services. Although union locals in (low-
skilled) private services have much higher entry and exit rates than those in
(mid-skilled) public services, differences in flows between union locals are
similarly large in these two sectors. In contrast, union locals have particularly
low variance in their entry, and above all, exit rates in manufacturing. In this
sector, we deal with a relatively homogeneous group of union locals that
struggle with very low inflows of new members — inflows that are clearly
insufficient to compensate for the outflows. Compared to the situation in
manufacturing, union locals are much less homogeneous within artisanat,
where the high standard deviation in entry rates suggests that thriving and
struggling union locals coexist in this sector.
Second, we find union locals to vary more in their entry than their exit
rates. For all union locals in our sample, the standard deviation was 5.6
percentage points for a mean entry rate of 11.9 per cent. In comparison, the
standard deviation amounted to only 3.7 percentage points for a mean exit
rate of 12.6 per cent. With the exception of public services, variance is at least
TABLE 2
Entry and Exit Rates Across Union Locals by Economic Sector, 2006–2008
Entry rate Exit rate n
Median Mean s.d. Median Mean s.d.
Primary building 11.9 12.7 3.5 12.6 12.8 2.3 42
Artisanat 12.1 13.1 4.9 13.2 13.3 2.5 42
Manufacturing 7.0 7.2 2.8 10.6 10.8 1.9 42
Private services 17.4 18.1 4.4 16.8 16.7 2.7 42
Public services 7.6 8.6 4.3 8.9 10.1 4.3 42
All 11.2 11.9 5.6 12.4 12.7 3.7 210
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50 per cent higher in inflows than outflows in all sectors. This result seems
consistent with the argument that growing and declining union locals prima-
rily differ in their capacity to recruit new members, while outflows are largely
given by the economic context.
Do trade unions expand their membership primarily through high inflows
(because of their attractivity in recruiting new members) or through low
outflows (because of their capacity in retaining members)? We address this
issue by plotting union locals’ annual net change in membership against their
annual entry and exit rates. The respective scatter plots — shown in Figures 1
and 2— reveal that net change in membership correlates much more strongly
with entry than exit rates. The Pearson’s coefficient is r = 0.75 for the corre-
lation between entry rates and net change, as compared to only r = –0.10 for
the correlation between exit rates and net change. Hence, there is a strongly
positive relation between inflows and membership growth, but only an insig-
nificant negative link between outflows and membership growth.
We analyse the impact of gross flows on net membership change with a
regression model. Since our observations stem from 70 union locals measured
over three consecutive years, we use a pooled time-series cross-section model
and calculate robust OLS-regressions with Huber–White standard errors
that correct for autocorrelation within union locals over consecutive years
(Breen 2005; 131). Moreover, we integrate controls for the different years.
Results are reported in Table 3 and show that only entry, but not exit rates,
are significantly linked with union locals’ net change in membership. More-
over, we account for much more variance in net change across union locals
FIGURE 1
The Relation between Annual Entry Rates and Net Change in Membership. N: 210;
Pearson’s r: 0.75.
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with entry than exit rates: entry rates and year dummies explain 57 per cent
of variance in membership evolution as to only 3 per cent for exit rates and
year dummies. These results thus indicate that the increase of a union local’s
entry rate by 1 percentage point leads to a net increase in union membership
by about 0.61 percentage point. In contrast, differences in exit rates do not
explain the variation in membership growth across union locals.
Having examined the link between flows and net change, we need to shed
light on the determinants of in- and outflows themselves. The issue at stake is
to know whether differences in flows between union locals are primarily due
FIGURE 2
The Relation between Annual Exit Rates and Net Change in Membership. N: 210;
Pearson’s r: -0.10.
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TABLE 3
Regression for the Determinants of Annual Net Change in Union Membership
Inflows on net change Outflows on net change
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Entry rates 0.61*** 10.59
Exit rates -0.12 -1.19
2006 0.01 1.66 0.01** 2.88
2007 -0.00 -0.47 0.00 0.71
2008 (reference)
Constant -0.08*** -11.15 0.00 0.05
R2 0.57 0.03
N observations 210 210
** Significant at the level P = 0.01; *** Significant at the level P = 0.001 (robust standard
errors).
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to external variables of a given labour market context (which are mostly
beyond union locals’ influence) or to internal factors reflecting organizational
differences between union locals. We address this issue by estimating two
different regression models of in- and outflows.
A first model analyses the impact of external factors that potentially
obstruct or, on the contrary, facilitate recruitment and retention of members:
union locals’ labour market environment in terms of unemployment, employ-
ment growth, union market share, workers’ job tenure, the proportion of
women and foreign workers in the recruitment area, large city or small town,
Latin or German-speaking canton, presence or absence of a concurrent
union. A second model only integrates two variables: sector and region
dummies. We argue that these two variables capture internal aspects of
organization and strategy: It is at the sectoral level that Unia and vpod define
their organizational strategy and lead their negotiations over — often
national, sometimes cantonal — collective agreements and pay increases
(Mach and Oesch 2003). These strategies are then adapted and put to practise
at the regional level, where recruitment activities and participatory forums
are set up. A union local is thus exposed to both decisions taken on the
sectoral and the regional level.
Table 4 shows the result of the model estimating the influence of the
external labour market context on member in- and outflows. Consistent with
expectations, these structural variables explain more variance in exit than
entry rates. Although differences are small (34 and 27 per cent of variance
explained, respectively), a union local’s labour market context seems to affect
TABLE 4
External Determinants (Linked to the Labour Market Context) of Annual Entry and Exit
Rates across Union Locals
Dependent variable
Entry rate Exit rate
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Unemployment rate 0.39 1.72 0.48** 3.31
Change in unemployment rate -0.18 -1.20 -0.23 -1.95
Change in employment -0.03 -0.79 -0.02 -0.53
Market share (union density) -0.12* -2.44 -0.11** -3.53
Job tenure (in years) -0.01** -3.58 -0.01** -2.84
Share of women -0.03 -0.74 -0.04 -1.73
Share of foreigners 0.11 1.33 0.04 0.81
Large city -0.02 -0.97 0.00 0.36
Latin canton -0.00 0.28 -0.00 -0.42
Presence of competing union -0.03** -2.72 -0.02*** -3.78
2006 0.01* 2.47 -0.00 -0.66
2007 0.00 1.25 0.00 0.83
Constant 0.22*** 4.70 0.20*** 8.18
R2 0.27 0.34
N observations 210 210
* Significant at the level P = 0.05; ** P = 0.01; *** P = 0.001 (robust standard errors).
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exit rates more than entry rates. When looking at single variables, we find
three contextual factors to be significantly linked to both entry and exit rates.
First, the presence of a competing union slightly depresses inflows, but also
leads to somewhat lower outflows. Hence, union locals confronted in their
recruitment area with competing unions seem to struggle more to organize
new workers, but once affiliated these workers show higher attachment.
Second, where union locals already organize a large share of the workforce in
their recruitment area, both in- and outflows are smaller. A large market
share thus reduces the potential for new recruitment, but since it leads to
stronger bargaining power and larger peer pressure, it is also conducive to
membership stability. Third, longer average job tenure in a given region and
sector is associated with lower in- and outflows. The result’s interpretation is
intuitive: where job tenure is on average short and hence job turnover high
(as for example in restaurants and hotels), union locals need to recruit more
workers in order to compensate for higher exit rates.
A variable that only seems to affect outflows, but not inflows, is unem-
ployment. In union locals where the unemployment rate is higher, outflows
are also higher. In contrast, annual changes in employment and unemploy-
ment are not significantly linked to in- or outflows. Not too much should be
made of this result: the period under study is short and covers three homog-
enous years at the end of a broadly shared cyclical upswing, when employ-
ment was growing and unemployment falling country- and sector-wide.
More interesting is the fact that a union local’s in- and outflows are neither
affected by the share of women and foreigners in its recruitment area, nor by
its setting in a large city or a particular linguistic region. These contextual
factors do not seem to explain why union locals’ have grown or declined over
the period under study.
Table 5 shows the results of the model capturing the effect of internal
differences between union locals, linked to region and sector organization, on
in- and outflows. Its explanatory power is almost twice as large as that of the
model integrating the external labour market context. When looking at single
variables, we find sectoral differences to have a particularly large effect on
inflows. Holding years and regional differences constant, our model predicts
an entry rate that is 6 percentage points lower in manufacturing and 5
percentage points higher in private services than in the reference category,
artisanat. In comparison, the effects of sector on exit rates are only half as
large. For exit rates, differences across regions seem to be more consequen-
tial. When taking Italian-speaking Ticino — the region with highest net
growth in membership over 2006–2008— as the benchmark, we find all other
regions to have significantly higher annual exit rates, exceeding those of
Ticino by 2–6 percentage points. While Ticino also performs better than
almost all regions in terms of inflows (the sole exception being Central
Switzerland), differences are only statistically significant with respect to 4 of
the 13 regions compared. The regressions in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that
union growth and decline are more usefully explained by sector and region—
which are linked, we argue, to internal differences in union locals’ strategy
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and organization — than by external differences in union locals’ labour
market environment.
5. A plausibility check of the results
Three questions arise with respect to these findings: First, is it plausible that
union growth is mainly determined by inflows — and not by outflows?
Second, why should entry rates be more consequential for union growth
than exit rates? Third, can we interpret region and sector differences as
differences of strategy rather than differences in union locals’ labour market
environment?
We discuss the first issue by comparing gross flows and net change of the
ten most strongly growing and the ten most strongly declining union locals
over the period 2006–2008.5 This comparison reveals that the three most and
TABLE 5
Internal Determinants (Linked to Union Organization) of Annual Entry and Exit Rates
across Union Locals
Dependent variable
Entry rate Exit rate
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Sector
Principal building 0.00 -0.35 -0.01 -0.77
Artisanat (reference)
Manufacturing -0.06*** -4.71 -0.03*** -4.71
Private services 0.05*** 4.44 0.03*** 6.24
Public services -0.04** -3.22 -0.03** -3.47
Region
Geneva -0.03 -1.33 0.04*** 4.78
Vaud -0.01 -0.42 0.04** 2.84
Valais -0.03 -1.38 0.02** 2.85
Neuchatel -0.03 -1.82 0.03*** 4.86
Larger Jura -0.04* -2.01 0.03*** 4.15
Fribourg -0.01 -0.75 0.06** 3.24
Ticino (reference)
Larger Basel -0.03 -1.74 0.05*** 5.21
Biel/Solothurn -0.04* -2.19 0.04** 3.36
Berne -0.04* -2.28 0.02*** 2.46
Aargau -0.05** -2.73 0.04*** 3.84
Central Switzerland 0.02 0.56 0.03*** 4.52
Zurich -0.01 -0.79 0.04*** 4.49
Eastern Switzerland -0.03 -1.73 0.05*** 8.95
2006 0.01** 2.77 0.00 -0.15
2007 0.01* 1.85 0.00 1.35
2008 (reference)
Constant 0.15*** 8.88 0.10 14.13
R2 0.58 0.56
N observations 210 210
* Significant at the level P = 0.05; ** P = 0.01; *** P = 0.001 (robust standard errors).
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the three least dynamic union locals differ very little in their exit rates, but are
separated by more than 20 percentage points with respect to their entry rates.
This finding implies that exit rates are, to some extent, given by the labour
market context: Union locals active in sectors with a convincing recruitment
strategy (private services, artisanat) and set in regions with a cohesive union
team (Ticino, Central Switzerland) overcompensate turnover in their mem-
bership with new affiliates. In contrast, union locals active in sectors without
a clear recruitment strategy (manufacturing) and set in regions with a lead-
ership problem and/or high rotation among union staff (Aargau, Eastern
Switzerland) fail to achieve entry rates that are sufficient to make up for
turnover in membership.
The key role played by entry rates is further highlighted by one of the few
studies to enquire into trade union flows: In an analysis of union growth in
the Netherlands, Jan Van Ours’s (1991) finds the strong decline in union
membership at the beginning of the 1980s and renewed growth after 1986 to
be driven by fluctuations in the entries of new members. Contrary to expec-
tations, the Dutch recession of the early 1980s did not lead to a higher exit
rate among union members, but to a decrease in the entry rate of new
workers. Between 1978–1979 and 1984–1985, the entry rate dropped from 10
to 6 per cent, whereas the exit rate remained stable at around 10 per cent (Van
Ours 1991: 11).
This leads us to the second issue of why inflows should be more conse-
quential for union growth than outflows. There are probably three main
reasons: A large fraction of outflows are — unlike inflows — due to causes
largely beyond the influence of unions, being related either to demographic
(birth of a child, death, out-migration) or work-related changes (change
of workplace, unemployment, retirement) (Jódar et al. 2009; Waddington
2006). In addition, there is an element of inertia in union membership. Once
an individual has joined a union, there is a tendency to remain affiliated even
if the original incentive for joining has disappeared (Elias 1996: 205). Hence,
if a union local loses dynamism and begins to underperform, this lethargy
will show quickly in a decline of inflows, whereas outflows are likely to react
much more slowly. Finally, outflows are not independent from inflows. In
fact, union locals that organize higher shares of new members are also likely
— all other things being equal — to experience higher rates of outflows. This
is due to the fact that median duration of union membership is short — five
years in the Netherlands (Visser 2002: 418), four years among CGIL
members of North-Eastern Italy (Vaona 2008: 264). Accordingly, the prob-
ability of leaving is by far highest among recent members. The tenuous
relationship between unions and recently recruited members is also evident
forUnia: 33 per cent of members who had joined the union in 2006 and 19 per
cent who had done so in 2007 had left again in 2009.
The impact of inflows on outflows can be estimated in a regression where
the dependent variable is the exit rate and the independent variable the entry
rate, with control variables for year and sector. The result is shown in Table 6
and confirms that union locals in Switzerland with higher entry rates also
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have to cope with higher exit rates. Our estimation suggests that an increase
of 1 percentage point in inflows is associated with a rise of 0.2 percentage
point in outflows. A period of very successful recruitment thus tends to go
along with higher outflows. For lethargic union locals, this finding implies
that a longer period of sluggish recruitment and falling inflows may actually
lead to declining outflow rates, because membership is more and more domi-
nated by very stable long-term members, whereas unstable recent recruits
become rare and rarer.
Despite our insistence that union success is primarily a function of recruit-
ment, this result suggests that the development of a specific retention policy
among recent affiliates is crucial for strongly growing union locals in order to
limit the revolving door effect. Moreover, in order to achieve high entry rates
over several years in a row, union locals need to constantly run recruitment
campaigns which put union staff under permanent stress. This may result in
burn-out and high rotation among union staff. Accordingly, ambitious goals
in terms of entry rates come at a cost and may not be sustainable over a
longer period. Beyond a threshold of 10–12 per cent of new yearly entries, it
may be more costly to further increase inflows than to reduce outflows.
Accordingly, the most successful union locals combine high entry rates with
average exit rates — a combination that is only possible if the affiliation of
the (annually very frequent) new members is stabilized in the first few years
of their membership.
This leads us to our third issue: Can we trace membership growth and
decline to tangible differences in union strategy on the sectoral and regional
level? The sector organizing private services within Unia is the result of
a union start-up of the mid-1990s, when the then two largest unions of
Switzerland that were later to merge into Unia — the manufacturing
union SMUV and the building union GBI — decided to jointly extend their
TABLE 6
The Impact of Entry Rate, Sector and Year on the Exit Rate
Coef. t-value
Entry rate 0.21* 2.37
Sector
Principal building 0.00 -0.57
Artisanat (reference)
Manufacturing -0.01 -1.59
Private services 0.02** 2.71
Public services -0.02 -1.90
Year
2006 -0.00 -0.88
2007 0.00 0.87
2008 (reference)
Constant 0.11*** 8.80
R2 0.45
N observations 210
* Significant at the level P = 0.05; ** P = 0.01; *** P = 0.001
(robust standard errors).
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organization into retail trade, hotels and restaurants. This joint venture
brought together the union leaders most strongly interested in union renewal,
who took up the challenge of sketching out an organizational strategy over
several years (Oesch 2011: 93–4). Since this unionization effort in private
services had started out from scratch less than 15 years ago, the emphasis on
permanent recruitment efforts still forms part of the sector’s organizational
culture today — a fact reflected by high inflows in union locals organizing
private services.
Likewise, the very low entry rates in manufacturing— for long the flagship
of Swiss unionism— can be attributed to actions unions took and, above all,
failed to take. The sharp recession of the early 1990s led to profound restruc-
turing of Switzerland’s industry. Downsizing, technological progress and
upskilling reduced the size of unions’ traditional blue collar clientele and
eroded, at the same time, unions’ long-established recruitment model in
manufacturing. Notably in the engineering industry, unions had traditionally
depended on works councillors and Vertrauensleute (union confidants) to
recruit new members, comparable to IG Metall in Germany (Windolf and
Haas 1989: 155). However, in the wake of production automation and edu-
cational upgrading, seats on works councils were increasingly taken by white-
collar employees who showed less allegiance to unions. Thus, this recruitment
channel began to dry out. In the absence of new recruitment strategies, union
efforts in manufacturing, particularly in engineering, gradually narrowed
down to the mere administration of the status quo. The absence of a shift in
resources towards organizing and recruitment officers hampered the genera-
tional renewal of union staff and resulted in very low entry rates.
An objection to our argument linking low entry rates in manufacturing
to the lack of a sector strategy is that low inflows in manufacturing
may be due to the sector’s adverse labour market environment, notably
de-industrialization and declining employment. This objection seems
unfounded for two reasons. First, over the period under study 2006–2008,
industrial production boomed in Switzerland and employment expanded
more in manufacturing (by annually 1.3 per cent) than in the principal and
secondary parts of building (-0.6 per cent) or private consumer services (-0.05
per cent). In terms of job growth, manufacturing was only outpaced by public
services (1.8 per cent). Second, union locals with a cohesive team and a clear
shift in priority towards recruitment such asUniamanufacturing in Ticino did
make strong headway among industrial workers, thereby proving that suc-
cessful organizing in manufacturing was possible: the union local ‘manufac-
turing in Ticino’ increased its membership by annually 4.4 per cent between
2006 and 2008 (mean entry rate: 13.7 per cent, mean exit rate: 9.3 per cent).
6. Conclusion
This study has enquired into the determinants of growth and decline in union
membership. Unlike the bulk of research that examines union density at the
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macro-level of country institutions or the micro-level of individual affiliation,
our analysis is set at the meso-level of the union local — the place where
members are actually recruited and retained. In order to get a better under-
standing of union locals’ growth and decline, we have tried to unearth the
gross flows hiding below the net change in membership. This analysis has
produced three main findings.
First, gross flows in union membership are much larger than the resulting
net changes. The public-sector union vpod registers annual in- and outflows
of about 9–10 per cent of its membership, whereas the annual entry and exit
rates of the private-sector unionUnia are somewhat higher at 12–13 per cent.
The literature suggests that membership turnover of around 10 per cent per
year is a surprisingly constant feature of West European unions.
Second, union growth and decline seems primarily determined by inflows.
Thriving union locals differ from languishing ones with respect to their entry
rates, whereas exit rates are more stable and follow, to some extent, entry
rates: Union locals with higher inflows have a larger share of new — and
hence unstable — members and thus also tend to have higher outflows.
Third, we observe large variance in union locals’ in- and outflows that is
neither accounted for by employment evolution nor by the demographic
composition of the recruitment area. In contrast, sector and region differ-
ences — which, as we argue, mainly translate differences in union organiza-
tion and strategy — strongly affect inflows and outflows. This suggests that
decisions and actions taken by unions have an influence on membership
above and beyond the labour market cycle and the institutional setting.
In sum, our findings indicate that union growth and decline cannot be
usefully explained with the sole reference to institutions and economic con-
ditions. Actors and their strategic choices are central to the understanding of
unions’ divergent trajectories in terms of membership. The policy implication
of this finding is straightforward: the key to union growth resides in larger
and better targeted recruitment efforts, whereas the membership potential of
retention policies — although by no means irrelevant — seems more limited.
It is only once higher entry rates have been achieved that outflows become an
issue. As higher inflows go along with many new and thus instable recruits,
limiting outflows in times of successful recruitment campaigns may demand
a special effort by union locals. Quite generally, the successful shift in union
practice from servicing existing members towards recruiting new members
depends upon union locals’ capacity to reorient their organizational structure
and culture towards organizing and constant recruitment — a reorientation
that may prove excessively difficult for many union locals.
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Notes
1. Interestingly, the two British studies find the most important organization-linked
reason for leaving a union to be: ‘representatives did not/did hardly ever contact
me’ (Waddington 2006: 26; Waddington and Kerr 1999: 192).
2. vpod stands for Verband des Personals öffentlicher Dienste (the Union of the Public
Services Personnel).
3. Note that not all member groups of Unia and vpod could be attributed to a union
local. In Unia, some members were classified in 2006 and 2007 as belonging to a
non-identified sector. In vpod, a few member groups (such as e.g. air traffic
workers) are not affiliated to any union local. Accordingly, these members were
excluded from the analyses based on union locals. For this reason, results based on
union locals (Table 2) do not exactly match results based on total membership
figures (Table 1).
4. On 1 October 2009, membership figures were 47,000 in the principal building
trades (masons), 45,300 in the secondary building trades (electricians, plumbers,
plasterers, carpenters), 47,700 for manufacturing (engineering, watch-making,
pharma industry), 39,600 for private services (retail trade, hotels and restaurants)
and 35,000 for public services (health care, education, public administration and
transports).
5. These tabulations are available from the author.
References
Baccaro, L., Hamann, K. and Turner, L. (2003). ‘The politics of labour movement
revitalization: the need for a revitalized perspective’. European Journal of Industrial
Relations, 9 (1): 119–33.
Breen, R. (2005). ‘Explaining cross-national variation in youth unemployment’. Euro-
pean Sociological Review, 21 (2): 125–34.
Checchi, D. and Visser, J. (2005). ‘Pattern persistence in European Trade Union
Density. A longitudinal analysis 1950–1996’. European Sociological Review, 21:
1–21.
Elias, P. (1996). ‘Growth and decline in trade union membership in Great Britain:
evidence from work histories’. In D. Gallie, R. Penn and M. Rose (eds.), Trade
Unionism in Recession. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 175–215.
Freeman, R. (1988). ‘Contraction and expansion: the divergence of private sector and
public sector unionism in the United States’. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2
(2): 63–88.
Frege, C. and Kelly, J. (2004). ‘Union strategies in comparative context’. In C. Frege
and J. Kelly (eds.), Varieties of Unionism: Strategies for Union Revitalization in a
Globalizing Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 31–44.
Member Flows in Union Locals 19
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2011.
Gallie, D. (1996). ‘Trade union allegiance and decline in British urban labour
markets’. In D. Gallie, R. Penn and M. Rose (eds.), Trade Unionism in Recession.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 140–74.
Goldstein, J. (1952). The Government of British Trade Unions. A Study of Apathy and
the Democratic Process in the Transport and General Workers’ Union. London:
George Allen and Unwin.
Hancké, B. (1993). ‘Trade union membership in Europe, 1960–1990: rediscovering
local unions’. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 31 (4): 593–613.
Jódar, P., Alós, R. and Vidal, S. (2009). ‘Por qué los afiliados al sindicato se dan de
baja. Un estudio de la desafiliación a partir de CCOO de Cataluña’. Sociología del
Trabajo, 65: 31–52.
Kelly, J. and Heery, E. (1989). ‘Full-time officers and trade union recruitment’. British
Journal of Industrial Relations, 27 (2): 196–213.
Kitschelt, H. (1994). The Transformation of European Social Democracy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Mach, A. and Oesch, D. (2003). ‘Collective bargaining between decentralization and
stability: a sectoral model explaining the Swiss experience during the 1990s’. Indus-
trielle Beziehungen, 10 (1): 160–82.
Milkman, R. and Voss, K. (2004). Rebuilding Labor: Organizing and Organizers in the
New Union Movement. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.
Oesch, D. (2011). ‘Swiss trade unions and industrial relations after 1990: a history of
decline and renewal’. In C. Trampusch and A. Mach (eds.), Switzerland in Europe.
Continuity and Change in the Swiss Political Economy. London: Routledge,
pp. 82–102.
Peetz, D. (1998). Unions in a Contrary World: The Future of the Australian Trade
Union Movement. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
Scharpf, F. (1991). Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Schnabel, C. (2003). ‘Determinants of trade union membership.’ In J. Addison and
C. Schnabel (eds.), International Handbook of Trade Unions. Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, pp. 13–43.
—— and Wagner, J. (2005). ‘Determinants of trade union membership in West
Germany: evidence from micro data, 1980–2000’. Socio-Economic Review, 3 (1):
1–24.
Towers, B. (1997). The Representation Gap: Change and Reform in the British and
American Workplace. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Undy, R., Ellis, V., McCarthy, W. and Halmos, A. (1981). Change in Trade Unions:
The Development of UK Unions since 1960. London: Hutchinson.
Van Ours, J.-C. (1991). Union Growth in the Netherlands 1961–1989, Research Memo-
randum 1991–33, Faculteit Der Economische Wetenschappen En Econometrie. Free
University of Amsterdam.
Vaona, A. (2008). ‘The duration of union membership in Italy: a research note’.
Industrial Relations, 47 (2): 260–5.
Visser, J. (2002). ‘Why fewer workers join unions in Europe: a social custom
explanation of membership trends’. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 40 (3):
403–30.
Waddington, J. (2006). ‘Why do members leave? The importance of retention to trade
union growth’. Labor Studies Journal, 31 (3): 15–38.
—— and Kerr, A. (1999). ‘Trying to stem the flow: union membership turnover in the
public sector’. Industrial Relations Journal, 30 (3): 184–96.
20 British Journal of Industrial Relations
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd/London School of Economics 2011.
—— andWhitston, C. (1997). ‘Why do people join unions in a period of membership
decline?’ British Journal of Industrial Relations, 35 (4): 515–46.
Western, B. (1995). ‘A comparative study of working-class disorganization: union
decline in eighteen advanced capitalist countries’. American Sociological Review, 60
(2): 179–201.
Windolf, P. and Haas, J. (1989). ‘Who joins the union? Determinants of trade union
membership in West Germany 1976–1984’. European Sociological Review, 5 (2):
147–65.
Appendix
TABLE A1
Descriptive Statistics of Variables, Measures and Data Sources
Variable Mean s.d. Source
Membership in union locals 2856 1650 Register data, Unia and vpod
Annual entry of new members into
union locals
334.2 238.6 Register data, Unia and vpod
Annual exit of members from union
locals
354.1 215.9 Register data, Unia and vpod
Annual change in employment in
locals’ organizational area
0.003 0.085 Swiss Labour Force Survey
Annual change in unemployment in
locals’ organizational area (in
percentage points)
-0.001 0.023 Swiss Labour Force Survey
Unemployment rate in locals’
organizational area
0.035 0.024 Swiss Labour Force Survey
Union density in locals’
organizational area (union
membership / employment in
locals’ area)
0.118 0.117 Register data of Unia and vpod /
Swiss Labour Force Survey
Average job tenure in years in
locals’ organizational area
9.847 1.334 Swiss Labour Force Survey
Share of women in locals’
organizational area
0.350 0.221 Swiss Labour Force Survey
Share of foreigners in locals’
organizational area
0.281 0.114 Swiss Labour Force Survey
Number of observations: 210 union locals.
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